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SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO DEMARCHE REQUEST ON U.S. SUPPORT FOR  
DARFUR PEACEKEEPING

REF: A. SECSTATE 098138  
[1](#)B. USUN NEW YORK 00580

[1](#)1. (SBU) SUMMARY. On July 19, USUN delivered ref A demarche and Note Verbale to United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Office of Mission Support Assistant-Secretary-General Jane Holl Lute. Holl Lute shared USG impatience over stalled deployment of the two AMIS infantry battalions but firmly reiterated DPKO's stance that funding for these battalions would be a donor, vice UN, responsibility. Holl Lute nevertheless promised Ambassador Sanders she would request an urgent meeting with the UN Comptroller to explore the possibility of UN funding for the battalions. In that meeting on July 20, the Comptroller determined that the Secretary-General (SYG) could request a standard pre-mandate commitment authority of \$50 million for partial AMIS funding, on the basis of the December 19 PRST and subsequent SYG Reports to the Security Council on Darfur peacekeeping. DPKO was emphatic that UN funding beyond troop costs, including paying for AMIS equipment and sustainment, would be an "absolute deal-breaker," as it would require the UN to assume responsibility for every existing African Union sustainment contract, as well as to defend this action to the UN Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), resulting in a lag of four to six months. END SUMMARY.

[1](#)2. (SBU) Participants in the July 19 demarche included: USUN Ambassador Jackie Sanders, Acting PolCouns, Poloff, MSC LTC Glenn Sadowski, PM Officer Mike Smith, DPKO A/SYG Jane Holl Lute, DPKO Africa Division Director Dmitry Titov, DPKO Senior Political Officer Mike Gaouette, DPKO Military Planning Service Chief COL Ian Sinclair, and DPKO Logistics Support Division Director Max Kerley.

[1](#)3. (SBU) Ambassador Sanders called for immediate deployment of the two additional infantry battalions (one from Rwanda, one from Nigeria) required as force protection for AMIS in Darfur. A/SYG Holl Lute shared Ambassador Sanders' impatience over this stalled deployment, which, according to what she was told by the AMIS Deputy Force Commander when visiting Darfur earlier this month, was on account of lack of accommodations. Holl Lute remarked that this excuse did not seem valid, given the relative obscurity of the need for hard-wall accommodations for infantry battalions. She added that she would be willing to push the Rwandan and Nigerian Missions in New York to accept tented accommodations to expedite the process.

[1](#)4. (SBU) COL Sinclair noted that the lack of APCs impacted the battalions' deployment, since Egypt's one-time offer to provide these assets was no longer tenable. Sinclair said

that in June DPKO had asked Rwanda and Nigeria to source their own APCs when their battalions deployed; Rwanda could provide 18, reimbursable by the UN, but Sinclair said Nigeria seemed to be "less forward-leaning" on the proposal. Smith concurred, adding that Nigeria's overall equipment posture presented considerable problems. With these constraints in mind, A/SYG Holl Lute asked for an update on the state of training and preparing of these two battalions.

15. (SBU) Ambassador Sanders inquired about Joint Special Representative Adada's and Force Commander Agwai's readiness to utilize the additional battalions. A/SYG Holl Lute cited helicopter mobility as a major challenge to Adada's work but hoped the issue would be resolved during the week of July 23.

Director Titov said that DPKO was encouraging Adada to spend as much time as possible in El Fasher, noting concerns Adada had raised about the "aloofness" of the humanitarian community in Darfur (ref B); non-payment of AMIS troop salaries, which made the incoming battalions reluctant to provide reinforcement; and lack of a communications framework. In response to Poloff's inquiry about Adada's staffing needs, Titov said that the pool of applicants was over 90 personnel, and he expressed hope that they could deploy quickly, adding that money was available and that recruitment was ongoing.

16. (SBU) DPKO Officer Gaouette reported an upcoming African Union (AU) leadership seminar in Khartoum in August to discuss technical issues associated with hybrid staffing and maintenance (e.g. Mission Subsistence Allowance). A/SYG Holl Lute reported a level of uncertainty among UN staff about the uniformity of rules governing UN and AU personnel to serve in Darfur. She mentioned that a team from the UN Logistics Base in Brindisi would be conducting a week-long induction

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training for incoming AU staff.

17. (SBU) On the issue of an October 1 transition date, Director Titov agreed with Ambassador Sanders on the need for an early transfer of authority from AMIS to the hybrid, not least for troop reimbursement reasons. However, Titov warned that any transfer was predicated on the presence of a support system to provide a minimum of assistance to incoming personnel. A/SYG Holl Lute thought an October 1 transition date would only switch AMIS to UN control without creating noticeable changes on the ground, thus damaging UN credibility from the outset and deflecting UN civilian staff attention from creating a foundation for hybrid support to absorption of AMIS shortfalls. She further elaborated that Heavy Support Package (HSP) assets still remained held up at Port Sudan and that contracts with PA&E were still being costed, thus delaying the process.

18. (SBU) On funding the additional battalions, A/SYG Holl Lute stressed this was a donor responsibility, since the HSP ceiling was already fixed as part of the deal struck with Khartoum to assure UN assistance to AMIS. To re-open this agreement would require both Sudanese and AU input, making it, as LSD Chief Kerley pointed out, a political question. Holl Lute also added that the battalions were not covered in UN-approved funding for the HSP, necessitating a re-initiation of funding processes if the issue were to be re-opened.

19. (SBU) Ambassador Sanders pushed DPKO to identify a way forward on this UN funding issue, and Director Titov speculated a request could be made by the SYG to the Council explaining the urgency of deploying the battalions and of using UN funding to do so. Titov cautioned that such a procedure would require prior consultations with Sudan, Rwanda, Nigeria, and the AU, which could result in a considerable time lag, especially if Khartoum opposed the deployment. A/SYG Holl Lute committed to requesting an urgent meeting with the UN Comptroller to explore the possibility of UN funding for the battalions and to discuss

possible complications such an arrangement could present, particularly in putting new UN-funded AMIS troops side-by-side with existing unpaid AMIS troops.

10 (SBU) That meeting took place on July 20, and the Comptroller determined that the SYG could request a standard pre-mandate commitment authority (PMCA) of \$50 million for partial AMIS funding, on the basis of the December 19 PRST (S/PRST/2006/55) and subsequent SYG Reports to the Security Council on Darfur peacekeeping. The SYG would then request the Council President via an exchange of letters for the PMCA, which the President could then authorize; DPKO will provide necessary language for this authorization. From there the Comptroller would approach the ACABQ with details of areas to be funded by the UN.

¶11. (SBU) This "wishlist," according to DPKO, would cover all troop reimbursement costs for the two battalions and the 7,700 AMIS troops. However, DPKO was emphatic that UN funding beyond troop costs (which amounts to \$1028 per soldier per month), including paying for AMIS equipment and sustainment, would be an "absolute deal-breaker," as it would require the UN to assume responsibility for every existing African Union sustainment contract. Assuming this responsibility would also require DPKO to defend this action to the ACABQ, resulting in a lag of four to six months. DPKO stressed that without the necessary command and control structures in place, as well as the support system Titov described in the July 19 meeting, UN assumption of all AMIS costs would have "massive negative material impact" and would result only in retaining the same (poor) quality force for the next four to six months.

¶12. (SBU) COMMENT. Ambassador Sanders appealed to A/SYG Holl Lute to view the deployment of the two battalions as a problem requiring the attention of all involved parties, rather than as a purely donor community issue. Holl Lute's insistence that DPKO has presumed donors would pay these troops reflects an unfortunate DPKO versus donor mentality, especially, as Director Titov admitted, when a donor community arrearage of four months in paying existing AMIS troops should have put DPKO on notice that donor funds were running out. Evidencing DPKO understanding of the limits of donor support, Holl Lute called Ambassador Sanders on July 20 informing that DPKO was actively revisiting the financing of the battalions. END COMMENT.

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